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Abstract
This paper analyzes the consequences of the interaction between
two diﬀerent levels of government (regulators) in the development of
housing policy when their decisions determine the level of competition
in the housing market. The analysis discusses the implications derived
from a lack of coordination between a local regulator who controls
the supply of land for housing development and a central regulator
who decides on housing subsidies. The results suggest that lack of
coordination has signiﬁcant eﬀects on prices and supply of houses,
housing developers’ proﬁts, and buyers’ surplus.
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11 Introduction
In many countries local governments have considerable control over the
supply of land for housing development. Sometimes local governments
issue building permits and charge development fees for the right to build
houses on privately owned land. In other situations, local governments own
d e v e l o p a b l el a n d( l a n db a n k i n g )a n dd e c i d eo nt h er a t ea tw h i c ht or e l e a s ei t
for development. Furthermore, often local governments ﬁnance a signiﬁcant
proportion of their expenses through development fees or the sale of sites for
housing development. The revenue that local authorities obtain in this way
permits them to ﬁnance public services for local residents, which are the ones
that vote in elections for the local government. A recent document of the
International Monetary Fund (2006), referred to Spain, states (paragraph
I.B.11) that: "... local administrations derive a substantial share of their
revenues from taxing real state. This creates perverse incentives to limit the
supply of residential and commercial land".
In this paper we show that local authorities may prefer not to allow
development of all sites available to increase their revenues from development
fees or from the sale of sites. This occurs even though local authorities
care also about consumer surplus in the housing market and not only about
their revenues from the development or sale of sites. This behavior of local
governments makes market failure important in the housing market, as they
induce oligopolistic control over housing development in a local housing
market and houses in diﬀerent local markets may not be good substitutes for
each other. The situation is analogous if local regulators require payments
in kind to issue building permits. In this case the local regulator may ask
the housing developers to supply public services to the community such as
parks, swimming pools, day nurseries, or sports ﬁelds. The local regulator
would now be concerned with value of the payment in kind that the local
community would obtain.
In this context the central government realizes that with respect to the
case where social surplus is maximized, too few houses would, in general, be
built and the price paid by buyers would be too high. To correct market
failure the central governments subsidize the purchase of houses, usually
through subsidies implicit in personal income tax. This approaches the
distribution of decision power on housing policy between local and central
regulators in several countries (see Smith, Rosen and Fallis (1988)).
2T h ep r i m a r ya d v a n t a g eo ft h i sd i v i s i o no fh o u s i n gp o l i c yb e t w e e nh i g h e r
and lower levels of government is that the central government can strongly
inﬂuence the evolution of the housing market, while taking advantage of local
governments’ intimate knowledge of local conditions. The primary diﬃculty
is that such a division of housing policy can lead to coordination failure
and reduce social surplus. In this paper we stress that the control of the
supply of land may be used by the local government to increase his revenue
collection. Alternatively, as in Brueckner and Lai (1996), one could consider
that land is privately owned and landowners inﬂuence the political process at
the local level. These landowners would try to induce decisions of the local
government that increase the revenue obtained through the sale of sites for
housing development.
In our model, the local regulator increases those revenues by reducing
the supply of land for housing development, thereby reducing competition
among housing developers. We explore the implications of this behavior
of the local regulator by constructing a housing market model where both
levels of government (regulators) interact and inﬂuence the decisions of the
developers and the buyers of houses. The central governments subsidize the
purchase of houses in order to achieve a higher social surplus. In our analysis,
s u b s i d i e st oh o m eb u y e r st r yt oo ﬀset the distortions deriving from the market
power induced by the behavior of the local regulator in a context where the
number of sites available for housing development is, anyway, limited.
The central regulator is a central housing agency concerned with the
surplus of the agents in the housing market. We implicitly suppose that
there are other central agencies that worry about other markets, other
objectives and other public policies. This specialization of concerns of public
agencies helps us to justify our partial equilibrium approach when deﬁning
the objective function of our central housing agency. However, we also
consider in the paper that the social cost of public funds may be greater
than 1, so that the measure of social surplus includes the surplus loss from
the distortions caused by the taxes used to ﬁnance housing subsidies.1
We compare the situation of the housing market when both regulators
act independently and when they behave as a single (or integrated) regulator
1Some housing policies such as the subsidies implicit in personal income tax have been
found to be vertically and horizontally inequitable (see Rosen (1985), and Smith, Rosen
and Fallis (1988)). Distributive aspects of housing policies, which are important and may
justify regulator involvement in the housing market, will not be considered in this work.
3who decides on both housing subsidies and the supply of sites for housing
development, to maximize social surplus. More precisely, we analyze the
consequences of the lack of coordination of both regulators on the supply of
houses, the supply of sites for housing development, the price of houses, the
net price paid by buyers, the proﬁts of the housing developers, and buyers’
surplus. This lack of coordination may cause a perverse mix of policies:
growth control of the housing market by the local regulator and subsidies by
the central regulator that increase growth in the market.
In this work we explicitly examine if savings in subsidies when the two
r e g u l a t o r sa c ti na ni n t e g r a t e dw a ya r eh i g he n o u g ht oa l l o wam o n e yt r a n s f e r
to the local regulator that would permit this regulator to attain the same level
of his objective function than under independent regulators. Our concern
with compensation of the local regulator is based on the fact that housing
laws often assign the decision power on site development to the local regulator
and, thereby, this regulator cannot be compelled to develop a speciﬁcn u m b e r
of sites.2 We consider that the local regulator gives up his decision power
on the development of sites only if he is compensated to attain the level of
his objective function that would obtain under independent regulators. The
question then is whether or not it is possible to compensate the local regulator
when the two regulators act as an integrated regulator. The analysis provides,
explicitly, realistic circumstances in which the compensation is impossible.
The study is carried out by considering a housing market where there are
many price-taking buyers and a group of housing developers competing à la
Cournot. However, the analysis presented is also valid if we consider that
there are many identical, but geographically diﬀerentiated and independent,
housing markets. Local housing markets may be approximated by districts
or cities, which are far enough apart for only local supply and demand
conditions to aﬀect prices and output. In each housing market there would
be a local regulator who would face the same objective function, under the
same circumstances, and would behave identically. The interaction among all
the agents can then be analyzed through the study of the interaction among
the agents in each market, since there would not be any strategic behavior
among the agents in diﬀerent markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
the housing market model. Section 3 analyzes housing policy under two
2It is usually considered that land use regulation is decided by the local regulator (see
Hanushek and Quigley (1990) and Brueckner (1990)).
4independent regulators. Section 4 studies housing policy when the two
regulators act in an integrated way. We call the basic model to the model
studied in those sections. Section 5 extends the analysis considering two
variants of the basic model: substitution eﬀects between new and used houses
and an alternative type of housing subsidy set by the central regulator. In
section 6 we discuss three extensions of the previous analysis that generate
new results: a social cost of public funds greater than 1, congestion eﬀects
on housing demand and density regulation. Finally, section 7 concludes and
oﬀers some suggestions for further research.
2 The Housing Market
Consider a perfect and complete information context in which the market
for houses is made up by housing developers who decide quantities as
in a Cournot oligopoly and by many price-taking buyers. All sites are
homogeneous and each developer gets only one particular site available for
housing development and builds houses on it.3 T h eu n i tc o s to fp r o d u c t i o n
of houses, represented by c, is constant. We will comment brieﬂyo nc o n v e x
production costs in section 5.
We shall initially study the market for new houses. Substitution eﬀects
between new houses and houses built in the past are assumed to be negligible.
To proceed let us denote by xj the number of new houses on site j
with j =1 ,...,n where n denotes the number of sites devoted to housing
development. We consider that all houses oﬀered in the market are identical
from the consumer’s point of view. Let h(x) be the inverse housing demand
function for new houses where x =
Pn
j=1 xj is the total number of new houses.
We make the following assumption on the demand function:
Assumption 1: For any x the inverse demand function h(x) is such that




Clearly, if h(x) is decreasing, concave or linear (h00(x) ≤ 0)a n dh(0) >c
then Assumption 1 will be satisﬁed.
3We consider that the extension of a site is big enough to allow several-story buildings
to be built on it. Hence, a site is clearly bigger than a lot, and we may see it as closer to
a subdivision.
5In the following sections we discuss housing policy decisions in a context
where there is interaction between two regulators: a local regulator and a
central regulator. Often the local authorities control the supply of sites for
housing development while the decision on housing subsidies is taken by
higher levels of government, and there may be lack of coordination between
the two regulators.4 This lack of coordination between both regulators may
aﬀect the number of sites available for housing development, thereby reducing
the number of housing developers and, as a result, the number of houses built.
We are going to compare, in terms of social welfare, supply of houses, the
price paid for buyers, price of houses and the proﬁts of housing developers,
the case in which both regulators act independently and the case in which
both act in an integrated way. In the ﬁrst scenario the timing of the game
is the following: In the ﬁrst stage the central regulator elects the per unit
subsidy she will pay each house buyer. In the second stage the local regulator
decides on the number of sites for housing development. Finally, in the third
stage housing developers, which compete à la Cournot, decide the number of
houses to be built. In the case in which both regulators act in an integrated
way the game has only two stages. In the ﬁrst one the integrated regulator
decides on both, the per unit subsidy and the number of sites to be developed.
In the second stage housing developers decide the number of houses to be
built. We start with the case of independent regulators.
3 Housing Policy Under Independent Regu-
lators
We solve the decision problem by backward induction in order to look for a
subgame perfect equilibrium.
Third stage:
Each consumer who purchases a house receives a per unit subsidy s.
Hence, the relationship between producer price p and the market sale level
x will be such that
h(x)=p − s.
Housing developer j, j =1 ,...,n, will solve the following problem (notice
4An interesting discussion on decisions in a system of hierarchical governments may be
found in Hoyt and Jensen (1990).




and the solution, xj(n,s) and x(n,s)=
Pn
j=1 xj(n,s), will satisfy
h
0(x(n,s))xj(n,s)+h(x(n,s)) = c − s. (1)
From (1) it is clear that the impact of the subsidy on house building
is analogous to the impact of a decrease in the unit cost of production
by an amount equal to the subsidy.5 Moreover, notice from (1) that
xi(n,s)=xj(n,s) for all i,j ∈ {1,...,n} with i 6= j and, hence, the
distribution of houses among sites will be symmetric. Assumption 1 and
this symmetric distribution of houses among sites guarantee that the second
order condition is satisﬁed. Adding conditions (1) for j =1 ,...,n we obtain
n(h(x(n,s)) − c + s)+h
0(x(n,s))x(n,s)=0 . (2)
Diﬀerentiating (2) and using Assumption 1 it is not diﬃcult to show that
x(n,s) increases with n and s and that xj(n,s) increases with s but decreases
with n for all n>1.
Second stage:
The goal of the local regulator is to maximize a weighted sum of the
revenue from the sale of sites and surplus of the buyers of houses, given the
per unit subsidy established by the central regulator. The demand for sites
arises from the proﬁts obtained by the sale of the houses built on sites (hence
the land market is endogenous in this model). We consider that the local
regulator attains a proportion t of the proﬁts of the housing developers in a
context where the local regulator owns initially all sites and sells some, or
all, of them to housing developers. This t could be the result of a bargaining
process, not speciﬁed in this paper, between the local regulator and the
housing developers.
Alternatively, we may assume that sites are privately owned and housing
developers pay proportional taxes on the proﬁts they obtain and that the
local government either collects these taxes directly or receives a percentage
5Sometimes the housing policy reduces the cost of house building directly. A subsidized
reduction in the interest rate in loans to developers would be an example of this type of
policy. In our analysis, s would correspond to the savings per house in interest paid.
7of taxes collected by the central government.6 Another possibility would be
to consider that the local regulator charges development fees for the right to
build houses on privately owned land. Notice that all these alternatives
are compatible with the assumption of proﬁt maximization by housing
developers. Moreover, to simplify the analysis, we consider that those
revenues obtained by the local regulator do not aﬀect the demand for houses
in a signiﬁcant way because they ﬁnance expenses that do not make more
valuable the ownership of a house.7
We consider that the objective function of the local regulator includes his
revenues from the sale of sites for housing development with a weight γ and
consumer surplus with a weight 1−γ,w h e r e0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. Let us denote by N
the maximum number of sites that may be given over to housing development.
So, given s, the local regulator will solve the following problem:8
max






s.t. n ≤ N.
Assuming interior solutions the ﬁrst order condition of this problem
implies:
γt(h(x(n,s)) + s − c + h
0(x(n,s))x(n,s)) − (1 − γ)h
0(x(n,s))x(n,s)=0 .









6We consider that the revenue obtained by the central regulator through these taxes
would not aﬀect her choice of subsidy to buyers of houses as housing subsidies are ﬁnanced
from general taxation and these taxes on the proﬁts of housing developers are a small
proportion of total taxes.
7We assume that this applies also in the case of payments in kind.
8We consider that the opportunity cost of land used for housing development is zero. If
sites have an alternative use (e.g., agriculture) we would have to add this possibility to our
analysis. Then, obviously, less sites would be devoted to housing development. However,
the core of our arguments would remain unchanged.














The number of sites developed by the local regulator does not depend on
the unit cost of production and, therefore, see (1), it does not depend on the
level s of the per unit subsidy established by the central regulator. When
we consider below ad valorem subsidies we obtain, instead, that the number
of sites developed by the local regulator depends on the level of the subsidy.
Note, however, that, as we will see in the analysis of the ﬁrst stage, houses
p e rs i t ew i l lc h a n g ea sar e s u l to ft h ep e ru n i ts u b s i d y .
As consumer surplus increases with n and the proﬁts of housing developers
decrease with n,w eh a v et h a tn∗ decreases with γ,t h ew e i g h to ft h er e v e n u e s
from the sale of sites. Notice, for example, that when γ =1it is n∗ =1 .
The reason is that industry proﬁts are maximized under monopoly, so the
local regulator, given s, would like to get x(1,s) houses built. In addition,
if γt < 1 − γ then n∗ = N. The reason is that consumer surplus increases
with the number of houses built, which increases with the number of housing
developers n.9
I th a sb e e na s s u m e dt h a ti ti st h el o c a lr e g u l a t o rw h oo w n sl a n df o r
housing development. Alternatively it could be the case that land is privately
owned. In that context the analysis of a situation in which landowners
dominate the political process at the local level as in Brueckner and Lai [3]
w o u l db ee q u i v a l e n tt ot h ea s s u m p t i o nγ =1in our model. The more general
speciﬁcation, γ 6=1 , would imply that landowners do not quite dominate the
political process at the local level as in Brueckner [2].10
Let us consider now the ﬁrst stage.
First stage:
9Obviously, if n∗ is not a natural number then the number of sites developed by the
local regulator will be dn∗e or dn∗e +1where dn∗e denotes the integer part of n∗.
10The implications of the analysis for the case γ =1are also valid for a situation where
there is no local regulator and all existing sites are owned by a cartel that maximizes
industry proﬁts. For a given s the cartel would like to produce x(1,s).I n t h i s c a s e ,
instead of an integrated regulator we would have a regulator that decides on the housing
subsidy and is concerned with the compensation of the cartel for the proﬁts that the cartel
loses when the regulator’s solution is established in the housing market.
9The central regulator sets the subsidy that maximizes social surplus.
In this work we measure social surplus as the sum of consumer (buyers of
houses) surplus, producer (housing developers) surplus and revenue obtained
by the local regulator from the development or sale of sites, net of the cost
of subsidies given by the central regulator to home buyers. So, as the central








The ﬁrst order condition of this problem implies
h(x(n
∗,s)) − c =0 .
As h(0) >cand h(x) is decreasing we may conclude that there is a unique
value of x, xw,s u c ht h a th(xw)=c. Therefore, the central regulator will
set the subsidy, sw(n∗), such that x(n∗,s w(n∗)) = xw, i.e., the subsidy that
induces the eﬃcient level of house building. Taking into account (2) we can






As xw does not depend on the number of sites developed we may conclude
that the subsidy that maximizes social welfare decreases with the number of
sites developed, i.e., dsw
dn < 0.
Maximization of social surplus requires that the buyers of houses pay a
consumer price equal to the marginal cost of production c.H o w e v e r ,w ek n o w
that the housing developers receive per house sold an amount equal to the
sum of the consumer price and of the subsidy set by the central regulator.
Therefore, the gross proﬁts of the developers are equal to the amount spent
on housing subsidies:
Π(n







The results would remain unchanged if the decisions of the two
independent regulators on subsidies and supply of sites were simultaneous
instead of sequential. In that case, the decisions n = n∗ and sw = −
h0(xw)xw
n∗
constitute the unique Nash equilibrium since from (4) the subsidy selected
by the central regulator maximizes social surplus given n = n∗,a n dg i v e n
10any housing subsidy the local regulator chooses n = n∗ to maximize
γtΠ(n)+( 1− γ)CS,w h e r eCS stands for consumer surplus.
4 Housing Policy Under an Integrated Reg-
ulator
Consider now an integrated regulator who decides on the number of sites to
be developed, n, and on the per unit subsidy, s. From her point of view, the
sale of sites generates revenues while housing subsidies are costly. However,
the integrated regulator decides on n and s to maximize social surplus. The
t i m i n go ft h eg a m ei sa sf o l l o w s :I nt h eﬁrst stage the integrated regulator
decides on both, n and s. In the second stage housing developers decide the
number of houses to be built.
Obviously the second stage of this game is identical to the third stage of
the game corresponding to housing policy under two independent regulators.
So, we solve the ﬁrst stage of the game.
From the analysis in Section 3 we know that the housing sale level that
maximizes social surplus does not depend on n. Hence, in this context any
number of sites n ∈ [1,N] combined with the corresponding housing subsidy
given by (4), with n∗ = n, maximizes social surplus. However, as the optimal
subsidy decreases with n, the cheapest way to maximize social surplus is to
set n = N and to choose the corresponding (low) housing subsidy.
Assume that the integrated regulator is required to maximize social
surplus with the lowest cost of subsidies. In this case, she decides n = N
and s = sw(N). Therefore, integration of both regulators aﬀects neither
the supply of houses nor the net price paid by buyers. It does, however,
reduce the price of houses, the supply of houses per site and the proﬁts of
housing developers if n∗ <N. Coordination of housing policies between the
two regulators in this context is valuable because it avoids the reduction in
competition induced by the local regulator under two independent regulators.
In other words, integration will foster competition in the housing market.
As we will show next, it would be cheaper to establish a housing
policy that maximizes social surplus under an integrated regulator and
to compensate the local regulator than to operate under two independent
regulators. On one hand, we have that consumer surplus is the same under
independent regulators than under an integrated regulator. On the other
11hand, denote by D(n) the diﬀerence between the cost of subsidies and the
revenue obtained by the local regulator through housing development when
n sites are developed; that is:
D(n)=s
w(n)x









< 0 for all t<1.
Therefore the coordination or integration of the two regulators permits
savings in subsidies that compensate for the reduction in revenue from the
sale of sites (except, obviously, when under independent regulators n∗ = N).
In other words, under integration it would be possible to guarantee the local
regulator the same revenue as in the case of independent regulators and to
save money from the public budget as a result of the reduction in the cost
of subsidies. We present an example of this compensation problem in Table
1 (see example A). Lack of integration between regulators would beneﬁtt h e
housing developers that get a transfer from the public budget.
5 Variants of the basic model
In this section we present two variants of the basic model analyzed in Sections
3 and 4: a model that includes substitution eﬀects between used and new
houses, and the consideration of ad valorem subsidies instead of per unit
subsidies. The results obtained for the basic model apply also to these
variants. However, the level of the ad valorem subsidy aﬀects the number of
sites developed.
An important property of houses is that they are a durable good. In
any housing market used houses constitute an important proportion of the
stock of houses available for use in a given period. Therefore, there may
be signiﬁcant substitution eﬀects between used and new houses. Next we
are going to study the implications derived from this fact in our analysis.
Consider that there exist U u s e dh o u s e si nt h em a r k e ta n dt h a tt h ee l a s t i c i t y
of substitution between new houses and houses built in the past is inﬁnite.
Speciﬁcally, assume that a used house is equivalent, in terms of housing
services provided, to a proportion α of a new house with 0 <α≤ 1 (the
12value of a used house for any buyer is a proportion α of the value of a new
house for that buyer).
The inverse demand function for new houses will be g(y) ≡ h(y + αU)
where y represents the number of new houses. Let us consider that only
purchases of new houses are subsidized.11 Expression (2) will now become:
n(h(y(n,s)+αU) − c + s)+h
0(y(n,s)+αU)y(n,s)=0 . (5)
Under independent regulators, the local regulator, given s,w i l ls o l v et h e
following problem
max






s.t. n ≤ N.
From the ﬁrst order condition of this problem we get, taking into account
(5), that the local regulator will develop exactly n∗ sites, where n∗ is given






If we denote by yw the number of new houses built it will be h(yw+αU)=c.




i.e., the number of new houses built will diminish by an amount equal to the
value of the stock of old houses in terms of new house units (that is, the total
number of houses expressed in new house units does not change).








Hence, taking into account (4) and that yw = xw − αU we may conclude
that the subsidy set by the central regulator is lower than in the case where
11Alternatively, we could consider that the purchase of a used house also receives a
subsidy from the central or integrated regulator, that this subsidy is αs,w h e r es is the
subsidy received by the purchaser of a new house, and that the seller of a used house pays
αs in taxes to that regulator.
13substitution eﬀects between new houses and houses built in the past are
assumed to be negligible (i.e., swu(n∗) <s w(n∗)). Therefore, as the number
of new houses decreases with respect to this latter case but the net price
paid by the buyers of new houses is still c, both, the price received by the
developers of new houses (p = c+swu(n∗)) and their proﬁts will decrease with
respect to the case where substitution eﬀects are negligible.12 In addition,
the budget required to attain xw under independent regulators is lower than
in that case.
The integrated regulator will decide to develop all sites available for
housing development if she is required to maximize social surplus with the
lowest cost of subsidies. As dswu
dn < 0,i ti si m m e d i a t et os e et h a t
dD(n)
dn < 0
for all t<1. Hence, integration of the two regulators also permits in this
case savings in subsidies that compensate for the reduction in revenue from
the sale of sites.
In the basic model it has been considered that the tool of the central
r e g u l a t o ri sap e ru n i ts u b s i d y .H o w e v e r ,i tw o u l da l s ob er e a l i s t i ct oc o n s i d e r
that the central regulator sets an ad valorem subsidy. Would this change the
results obtained in the analysis? Let us consider that each buyer of a new
house receives as subsidy an amount equal to d.p. I nt h i sc a s ei tm a yb e
shown that, with independent regulators, the total number of houses built
and the price paid by buyers are the same than under a per unit subsidy.
However, the price of houses, the proﬁts of housing developers and the cost of
subsidies are greater when the housing subsidy is ad valorem rather than per
unit. The reason for these latter results is that with ad valorem subsidies an
increase in the price implies an increase in the amount of the subsidy; then
the housing developers are more interested in reducing quantity (increasing
price). It is easy to obtain that with this type of housing subsidies the number












Hence, we have that dn∗∗
dd ≤ 0 and that n∗∗ ≤ n∗. Lastly, it may be concluded
that, as in the case of per unit subsidies, the gross proﬁts of the developers are
equal to the amount spent on subsidies and the coordination or integration
of the two regulators permits savings in subsidies that compensate for the
12Note that if a used house is sold, the buyer will pay αc for this house.
14reduction in revenue from the sale of sites (except, obviously, when under
independent regulators n∗∗ = N).
6 Extensions
In this section we extend the previous analysis to study separately: (A) the
implications of considering that the social cost of public funds is greater
than 1, (B) the consequences of introducing a congestion eﬀect on housing
demand, and (C) the case where density regulation is a policy tool of the
local regulator.
(A) Social cost of public funds greater than 1. An additional aspect which
seems relevant in the analysis is that, as a consequence of the distortions
caused by taxes, the social cost of public funds may be greater than 1.I n
this case social surplus will be given by the sum of consumer surplus and
producer surplus net of the social cost of subsidies; that is,
Z x
0
h(y)dy − cx − (λ − 1)sx,
where λ is the marginal cost of public funds with λ>1. Let us consider the
case of independent regulators. The third and second stages of the game do
not change by considering a social cost of public funds greater than 1.I ti s
because neither the developers of new houses nor the local regulator do care
about the social cost of subsidies. The level of the subsidy which maximizes








A sf r o m( 2 )w eg e t
∂(x(n,s))
∂(s) > 0, we may conclude that the price paid by buyers
will be greater than the marginal cost of production, i.e., h(x(n∗,s wλ(n∗))) >
c, and therefore the proﬁts of the housing developers will be higher than the
cost of the subsidies. The reason is that the social cost of the subsidies is
greater than when λ =1and so, the subsidy set by the central regulator, and
as a result the number of houses built, will be smaller than in that situation.
Consider now the case of an integrated regulator who decides on n and





h(y)dy − cx(n,s) − (λ − 1)sx(n,s)
15s.t. n ≤ N.
Assuming interior solutions the ﬁrst order conditions are such that
(h(x(n,s)) − c − (λ − 1)s)
∂(x(n,s))
∂s
=( λ − 1)x(n,s) (7)
and,




Obviously for x>0 both equations cannot be satisﬁed simultaneously.
As
∂(x(n,s))
∂s > 0,f r o mc o n d i t i o n( 7 )w eg e th(x(n,s)) − c − (λ − 1)s>0.
Hence, as
∂(x(n,s))
∂n > 0 the integrated regulator will decide to develop all the
sites and will set the subsidy swλ(N) given by (6). This subsidy is smaller
than the subsidy corresponding to the case λ =1 ,t h a ti s ,sw(N) given by
(4). Therefore the price paid by buyers of houses is greater than c,a n dt h e
proﬁts of the housing developers will be higher than the cost of subsidies.
When λ>1 savings in subsidies after integration may not be enough
to compensate the local regulator as the proﬁts of the housing developers
under independent regulators may be too high. Examples B and C of Table
1 illustrate this situation.13 Hence, an observed lack of coordination between
the two regulators may be due to social cost of public funds being greater
than 1.I nt h a tc o n t e x ti tm a yb ed i ﬃcult to convince the local regulator to
a c ti na ni n t e g r a t e dw a y .
(B) Congestion eﬀects on housing demand. W en o wi n t r o d u c ea
congestion eﬀect on housing demand and discuss its consequences. Let us
denote by g(x,xo) the inverse housing demand function corresponding to
as i t ew h e nt h e r ea r exo houses built on that site. This demand function
incorporates a congestion eﬀect as the value for a consumer of a house on a
site depends on the number of houses built on it. We assume that
δg
δxo < 0
and, thus, that an increase in the number of houses built on a site diminishes
the value of a house on that site. The reason is that householders prefer sites
with low rather than high densities.
13In example B savings in subsidies after integration are enough to compensate the
local regulator. As in this example γ<1, compensation of the local regulator takes into
account the variation in consumer surplus when both regulators coordinate. In example
C savings in subsidies after integration are not enough to compensate the local regulator
when t>0.85.
16The main eﬀects of congestion may be unraveled considering that g is
linear. We study the case of g linear in the Appendix and present here the
intuition of the eﬀects that generalize to other functional forms of g.14 Notice
ﬁrst that, for any n, x(n,s) decreases with the intensity of the congestion
eﬀect as demand will be lower the higher this intensity is. This is also the
reason for the decrease of the number of houses that maximizes social surplus
with the size of the congestion eﬀect. Moreover, this number increases with
n as the congestion eﬀect of an additional house for a given number of houses
is smaller the higher n is and, hence, the total social marginal cost, i.e., the
production cost plus the congestion cost caused by this house, decreases with
the number of sites. Notice that this total social marginal cost will be exactly
the net price paid by buyers.
Under independent regulators, congestion eﬀects induce the local
regulator to develop a greater number of sites as, for any supply of houses,
congestion diminishes with n and, therefore, the willingness to pay for a house
increases for each buyer with that number. However, the local regulator may
choose n<Ngiven that he also considers the eﬀect of the number of sites
d e v e l o p e do nt h et o t a lp r o ﬁt of housing developers through the change in
market competition. In the case of an integrated regulator she still chooses
to develop all sites available for housing development as, both, competition
and demand increase with the number of sites developed.
Hence, lack of coordination between the local and the central regulator
decreases, in general, social surplus and the number of houses available.
Moreover, the price of houses, the proﬁt so fs e l l e r sa n dt h en e tp r i c ep a i d
by buyers will be greater under independent regulators. Finally, from the
analysis in the Appendix we know that the diﬀerence between the cost of
subsidies and the revenue obtained through the sale of sites may increase
when both regulators coordinate. If this occurs, it will be more expensive
to establish under an integrated regulator a housing policy that maximizes
social surplus and to compensate the local regulator, than to operate under
two independent regulators.
When g is separable the analysis of the eﬀects of congestion on the housing
market is analogous to that of considering diﬀerent production cost functions.
From the Appendix it is clear that the assumption of a linear congestion eﬀect
is equivalent, in terms of results, to the consideration of the convex cost
14In particular, we concentrate on situations where the equilibrium in the housing market
implies a symmetric distribution of houses among sites.
17function C(x)=cx+zx2,w i t hc>0 and z>0, in a context where there are
no congestion eﬀects. Therefore, the analysis presented in this section is also
valid to illustrate the consequences derived from the incorporation of convex
cost functions in our study.
(C) Density regulation. In a context with congestion eﬀects, density
regulation may be a housing policy tool. Density regulation may be attained
by limiting the height of the apartment buildings or establishing a minimum
size for individual lots within sites. We will interpret density regulation as
a limit by the local regulator on the maximum number of houses that may
be built on a site. In order to brieﬂy discuss the consequences of density
regulation we consider that g is such that both the integrated regulator
and a cartel of housing developers that owned all sites available for housing
development would be interested in a symmetric distribution of houses among
sites (this includes the case of g linear).
In this context, under independent regulators the local regulator decides
on the maximum number of houses that can be built on a site, x∗
j,a n do n
n.I fγ =1he will select n = N and will decide on x∗





j is the quantity of houses that a cartel which had bought
all sites would supply given s. The reasons are that for a given quantity of
houses congestion is minimized when n = N and that a cartel maximizes
industry proﬁts. If γ<1 the number of houses built would be greater. Taking
into account the behavior of the local regulator, the central regulator will
choose the subsidy inducing the level of housing construction that maximizes
social welfare when n = N. Although an integrated regulator would also
choose n = N, she would permit on each site the level of production resulting
from Cournot competition. Hence, the subsidy required to induce the level of
housing construction that maximizes social welfare when n = N will be lower
under an integrated regulator than under independent regulators. However,
integration would maintain the supply of houses, congestion, the net price
paid by buyers, and social surplus. Therefore, the price of houses and the
proﬁts of housing developers will be lower when both regulators coordinate.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has examined the interplay between two diﬀerent levels of
government in the development of housing policy when the regulators’
18decisions determine the level of competition in the housing market. To our
knowledge, there is no previous theoretical research on this problem in the
literature. We have discussed the eﬀects of a lack of coordination between a
local regulator who decides on the supply of sites for housing development and
a central regulator who decides on housing subsidies. The central regulator
maximizes social surplus and the local regulator maximizes a weighted sum
of the revenue from the sale of sites and of the consumer surplus.
We have compared the eﬀects (on prices, supply of houses, developers’
proﬁts, and buyers’ surplus) of the decisions when the two regulators act
independently and when they behave as a single integrated regulator who
maximizes social surplus and decides on both housing subsidies and the
supply of sites. The ability to compensate the local regulator when both
regulators act in a coordinated way has been explicitly studied because he
will not want to give up his decision power on the development of sites if
compensation is not guaranteed. We have pointed out that our analysis of the
case of independent regulators is also valid for a situation where landowners
inﬂuence the political process at the local level and have power to determine
the supply of sites.
We have developed a model in which we analyze the interaction among
all agents active in the housing market: housing developers, buyers and
two diﬀerent levels of government. In this model we have shown how
subsidies given by the central regulator may become proﬁts for the housing
developers and how the local regulator may reduce competition in the housing
market to increase his revenues. As a consequence, under an integrated
regulator competition in the housing market is at least as high as under
two independent regulators. Competition under two independent regulators,
however, increases with some factors, as the existence of congestion eﬀects
on housing demand or increasing marginal costs of production.
Summarizing, on one hand, when the proﬁts of the housing developers
are equal to the subsidy cost, compensation is feasible because the subsidy
cost is decreasing with the number of housing developers (competition in the
housing market) and this number is not lower under the integrated regulator
than under two independent regulators. The level of both the proﬁts of the
housing developers and the subsidy cost will depend, for example, on the
elasticity of substitution between new and used houses. On the other hand,
when the proﬁts of the housing developers under independent regulators are
19higher than the subsidy cost (the net price paid by buyers is higher than
the unit cost of production) integration of both regulators increases social
surplus. However, in this case compensation may be impossible. This occurs
in our model when the social cost of public funds is greater than 1,t h e r ea r e
congestion eﬀects on housing demand or the marginal cost of production is
increasing.
Our analysis provides a framework where other problems of regulation
and competition in the housing market may be studied. One could consider,
for instance, that the revenue of the local regulator comes from ad valorem
taxes on houses sold in the market. Moreover, further research could examine
contexts where the owners of sites compete in ways diﬀerent from the one
considered in this work (competition on location or quality, for instance).
Finally, as houses are a durable good one may introduce time into a housing
market related to the one presented in this work and study the eﬀects of
policies such as the promotion of rental housing.
Appendix: Congestion eﬀects on housing
demand with a linear inverse demand function
Let us denote by z the eﬀect of an additional house built on a site on the
willingness to pay for a house on that site. We assume that the inverse
demand for houses on site j, j =1 ,...,n,i s
g(x,xj)=e − fx− zxj,
where e, f and z are positive constants.
Considering that each buyer receives a per-unit subsidy s, ﬁrm j, j =
1,...,n, will solve the following problem:
max
xj
(e − fx− zxj + s − c)xj,
and the solution, xj(n,s) and x(n,s)=
Pn
j=1 xj(n,s), will satisfy
e − fxj(n,s) − 2zxj(n,s) − fx(n,s)=c − s. (8)
F r o m( 8 )w ed e r i v ea ss o l u t i o nas y m m e t r i cd i s t r i b u t i o no fh o u s e sa m o n g
sites and obtain15
15The symmetric distribution of houses among sites guarantees that the solution derived
20x(n,s)=
n(e − c + s)
f(n +1 )+2 z
. (9)
Observe that x(n,s) increases with n and s and decreases with z.
Without loss of generality we perform the analysis of the regulators
decisions considering that γ =1in the objective function of the local
regulator. In this case under independent regulators the local regulator will
solve
max
n t(e − fx(s,n) − zxj(s,n)+s − c)x(s,n).
Using (9), we obtain that the local regulator will decide n∗z =1+2z
f (if
1+2z
f <N)a n dn∗z = N (otherwise).
The total congestion eﬀect is collected by z
Pn
j=1(xj)2 given that the
surplus of each buyer of a house on site j diminishes in zxj by the congestion











(e − c + s)
f(n +1 )+2 z
)
2 − c
n(e − c + s)
f(n +1 )+2 z
.
From the ﬁrst order condition of this problem we obtain that the number of






Observe that xw increases with n and the optimal number of houses per site
(congestion) decreases with n.
From the second stage of the game we know that n = n∗z.T h e n w e








Notice from (10) and (11) that xw(n∗z) and sw(n∗z) decrease with z.
Consider now that an integrated regulator decides on n and s.I ti se a s y
to show that in order to maximize social surplus the integrated regulator
chooses n = N and






Hence integration of the two regulators increases, in general, the number of
houses available and social surplus, and reduces congestion, the price paid
by buyers, c + zxw











In this case savings in subsidies after integration may not be enough to
compensate the local regulator. Clearly it is more diﬃcult to compensate
the local regulator the greater t and z are. In Table 1 we include an
example, example D, of this compensation problem. In that example savings
in subsidies are not enough to compensate the local regulator when t>0.4.
We have obtained, in our subgame perfect equilibria, that all housing
developers build the same number of houses. As we will show next, this is a
requirement for the maximization of social surplus when there are congestion
eﬀects. Given xw and xw
j for all j 6= i,k, maximization of social surplus


















where A is a constant, is xw
i = xw
k. As this result is valid for any pair of sites
i and k we may conclude that xw
j = xw
n for all j =1 ,...,n.
Lastly, notice that from the maximization problem of ﬁrm j we may
conclude that the analysis developed in this Appendix applies to the
situations where h(x) is linear, there are no congestion eﬀects, and the
production cost function is C(xj)=cxj + zx2
j with c>0 and z>0.
22References
[1] Brueckner, J. K., 1990, Growth Controls and Land Values in an Open
City, Land Economics 66, 237-248.
[2] Brueckner, J. K., 1995, Strategic Control of Growth in a System of Cities,
Journal of Public Economics 57, 393-416.
[ 3 ] B r u e c k n e r ,J .K .a n dF .L a i ,1 9 9 6 ,U rban Growth Controls with Residents
Landowners, Regional Science and Urban Economics 26, 125-143.
[4] Hanushek, E. A. and J.M. Quigley, (1990), Commercial Land Use
Regulation and Local Government Finance, American Economic Review
80 (2), 176-180.
[5] International Monetary Fund, (2006), Spain: Financial Sector
Assessment Program, Technical Note on Housing Prices, Household Debt,
and Financial Stability, IMF Country Report No. 06/210.
[6] Hoyt, W. H. and R. A. Jensen., 1996, Precommitment in a System of
Hierarchical Governments, Regional Science and Urban Economics 26,
481-504.
[7] Rosen, H. S., 1985, Housing Subsidies: Eﬀects on Housing Decisions,
Eﬃciency and Equity, in: A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein eds.,
Handbook of Public Economics, vol. 1 (North Holland, Amsterdam), 345-
420.
[8] Smith, L.B., K.T. Rosen and G. Fallis, 1988, Recent Developments in












γ =1 ,λ=1 .1
Example D
















n 44 1 4
R 416.66 264 1543.37t 510.2t
SC 625 220 1122.45 204.08
CS 1250 968 771.68 408.17
INTEGRATED REGULATOR
n 55 5 5
R 333.33 262.31 393.47t 488.28t
SC 500 143.08 143.08 195.31
CS 1250 983.67 983.67 488.28
Note: R: Regulator’s revenue from the sale of sites, SC: Subsidy cost,
CS: Consumer surplus, and it has been considered that h(x)=1 0 0−x, c =
50,a n dN =5 .
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